What do surveys of Ukrainian public opinion say about 'peace at any cost' - giving up land and NATO/EU aspiration in exchange for peace in late 2025? Search in Ukrainian too perhaps.
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Ukrainian public opinion peace at any cost surveys 2025What Ukrainian surveys say about “peace at any cost” in late-2025
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| Issue | Latest survey findings (July–Aug 2025) |
|---|---|
| Negotiations vs. “fight to victory” | 69 % want Kyiv to negotiate “as soon as possible”; only 24 % still back fighting “until victory” – a near-complete reversal from 2022 (73 %). |
| Territorial concessions | 52 % are “strongly opposed” to any land-for-peace swap; 76 % reject ceding the post-24 Feb 2022 occupied areas; only ~15 % would accept even that smaller concession. |
| NATO ambition | Belief that Ukraine will join NATO within 10 years has fallen from 64 % (2022) to 32 %, but permanently renouncing NATO (as Russia demands) is still rejected by 76 %. |
| EU aspiration | 52 % still think Ukraine will enter the EU (down from 73 % in 2022) and EU accession is the least-contested element in every external peace plan. |
| Concrete peace plans tested | - Russia’s plan (recognise annexations, demilitarise, drop NATO bid) – 76 % “categorically against”, only 17 % could accept. - U.S. plan (Crimea recognised, EU path, Euro-only security guarantees) – 39 % accept, 49 % reject. - Europe-Ukraine plan (no formal recognition of occupation, US + EU security guarantees, EU path, phased sanctions relief) – 54 % accept, 30 % reject; the only proposal with net support. |
| “Peace at any cost” overall | Even among the 70 % who want talks, large majorities reject the actual “costs” Russia or the U.S. demand (land, NATO, security downsizing). Experimental evidence: showing respondents a Zelenskyy statement prioritising lives over territory did not increase tolerance of land concessions, indicating limited room for leaders to move opinion. |
Bottom line
Ukrainians are exhausted and ready to talk, but not ready to pay “any cost”.
Giving up newly occupied territory, formally recognising Crimea, or permanently abandoning NATO remain politically toxic.
The only compromise that could gain pluralities is non-recognition of Russian control, EU membership track, and credible Western security guarantees – the elements of the “Europe-Ukraine” plan.
Giving up newly occupied territory, formally recognising Crimea, or permanently abandoning NATO remain politically toxic.
The only compromise that could gain pluralities is non-recognition of Russian control, EU membership track, and credible Western security guarantees – the elements of the “Europe-Ukraine” plan.